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Do migrants follow market potentials?
An estimation of a new economic geography model
Matthieu Crozet ∗
Abstract
New Economic Geography models describe a cumulative process of spatial agglomer-
ation: Firms tend to cluster in locations with good access to demand, and similarly,
workers are drawn to regions where market potential is high because the price index is
lower there. This paper provides an empirical assessment of this forward linkage that
relates labour migrations to the geography of production through real wage differen-
tials. In the spirit of Hanson (1998), we use bilateral migration data for five European
countries over the 1980s and 1990s to perform quasi-structural estimations of a new
economic geography model derived from Krugman (1991). The results show strong
evidence in favor of this model. As expected, migrants do follow market potential.
Moreover, we provide estimates for all key parameters of the model. These estimates
suggest that a sudden emergence of a core-periphery pattern is unlikely within Euro-
pean countries: centripetal forces are too limited in geographical scope, and mobility
costs are too high.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, the new economic geography has gained remarkable momentum.
The theoretical tools derived from the seminal contributions of Krugman (1991, 1992)
and Krugman and Venables (1990, 1995) have contributed to an improved analysis
of economic agglomerations. They have also engendered considerable interest from
researchers and policymakers, especially in the European Union, where there is concern
that further integration and successive enlargements may threaten regional cohesion
(Puga, 2002). Although a great deal of theoretical literature has followed this paper
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(See Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999 and Neary, 2001 for reviews of the current
state of theoretical knowledge), new economic geography (henceforth referred to as
NEG) has not yet generated a comparable volume of empirical literature. Hence,
empirical work has a prominent place in the research agenda, : as propounded by
Fujita et al. (1999)1: “[. . . ] we clearly need much more [empirical] work as closely
tied to the theoretical models as possible. [. . . ] Under what conditions do economies
really spontaneously evolve a core-periphery pattern? Is Europe really going to be able
to maintain its polycentric industrial geography?” (Fujita et al., 1999. p. 347-348).
The aim of this article is to help fill this gap and answer the questions raised by
Fujita et al.. We use annual inter-regional migration data for five European countries
over the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relevance of the NEG framework. Moreover,
the paper attempts to measure the strength of the centripetal forces that may affect
the geography of European countries.
Krugman’s (1991) original model describes a Hirschmann-type cumulative process
(Hirschmann, 1958)of spatial agglomeration based on the interaction of two centripetal
forces. The first force at work - backward linkage - influences the location choice of
firms: in the presence of transport costs and scale economies, a region with a good
access to markets is the preferred location for a firm. In the same way, forward linkage
influences the location choice of individuals for central markets: in a region offering
good access to a large range of commodities, the cost of living is lower because con-
sumption incurs lower transportation costs. Put together, these two forces reinforce
each other and encourage firms and workers to cluster2.
Therefore, in a standard NEG framework, agglomeration may occur because ac-
cess to markets positively influences the location choices of both firms and workers.
However, most empirical investigations explicitly referring to NEG models are mainly
devoted to the assessment of backward linkage. Indeed, one can roughly divide the ex-
isting empirical literature into three groups, all of which explain firm behavior through
1The same call for more empirical research of this nature was made by Neary (2001).
2This agglomeration process is balanced by a dispersion force that emanates from the greater
competition that arises when the concentration of firms increases. It should be noted that input-
output relations between industries may also play the role of forward linkage and induce agglomeration
even when the model does not allow for migration (Krugman and Venables, 1995, Puga, 1999).
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the importance of market access (see Overman, et al. (2003) for a comprehensive
survey). First, a significant part of the empirical research aims at assessing whether
greater access to demand in a region favors local firms. Such a relation, known as
the “home market effect”3, plays a large part in backward linkages. Recent studies,
such as Davis and Weinstein (1999), Head and Ries (2001), or Trionfetti (2001), have
found strong evidence of home market effects. Secondly, the literature on firms’ loca-
tion choice has supported the backward effect hypothesis. Assuming that firms choose
among alternative locations in order to maximize their expected profits, these studies
confirm that plants are drawn to regions with good access to demand (see, for instance,
Friedman et al., 1992, Devereux and Griffith, 1998, Head and Mayer, 2002, Crozet et
al., 2003). Thirdly, Hanson (1998) and Redding and Venables (2000) explore the spa-
tial correlation of factor prices and demand. These two papers exploit an equilibrium
equation of the NEG models, i.e., the wage equation that relates nominal wages in each
region to its distance from economic centers. Here again, the underlying intuition is the
backward effect: a greater access to markets ensures higher profits for local firms, and
thus higher wages in the long run. Using cross-country data, Redding and Venables
(2000) show that good access to sources of supply and demand positively affects per
capita incomes. Hanson (1998) studies the wage equation of a new economic geogra-
phy model based on Krugman (1991) by performing a nonlinear estimation based on
US county panel data. Such structural estimation proves the positive influence of the
neighboring incomes on local wages, which is consistent with strong backward linkages
among regions. Moreover, Hanson uses nonlinear least squares estimates of the model’s
key parameters of in simulations suggesting that agglomeration forces are limited in
geographic scope. The economic influence on surrounding wages that emanates from
a given county decreases rapidly with distance: it is effective only within a radius of
less than 1000 kilometers.
In the spirit of Hanson (1998), we perform a quasi-structural estimation of the
NEG model. However, unlike most of the empirical literature on new economic geog-
3“Home market effect” states that, in an increasing return industry, an increase in local demand
results in a more than proportional increase in production and employment. This theoretical result
is a standard prediction of monopolistic competition trade models. It also appears in NEG models.
3
raphy, the focus here is on forward linkage. We analyze the core equation of the NEG
model that relates labour migrations across regions to the geography of production
through real wage differentials. Hence, the paper examines whether access to markets
(which defines the theoretical price indexes) has a significant positive influence on mi-
gration choices. Econometric results provide strong evidence for this forward linkage.
Moreover, the structural NEG framework is found to have a better fit than a simpler
competing model. Finally, simulations based on parameter estimates show that the
geographic scope of centripetal forces is quite limited. These forces are too weak to
fully balance the high barriers to migration that affect the location choices of individ-
uals. Hence, these empirical results suggest that forward linkages and labour mobility
are not sufficiently strong to cause a rapid evolution of the geography of European
countries toward a core-periphery pattern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the theo-
retical framework for our analysis. The third section discusses some estimation issues
and describes the data used. Section 4 presents econometric results for the two spec-
ifications of the migration equation: a simple gravity model and the structural model
of NEG. In section 5, parameter estimates of the NEG model are used in simulation
exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
This section derives a tractable migration equation from a new economic geography
model. This framework emphasizes the role of access to markets in regional dynamics.
Indeed, agglomeration processes are driven by centripetal forces appearing to be closely
related to Harris’ (1954) market potential functions. Harris defined a measure of the
demand that a firm faces as the economic size of all surrounding locations weighted
for distance: Market Potentiali =
∑R
j=1 (Yj/di,j), where R is the number of locations
within the relevant area, Yj the economic size of region j, and dij is the geographical
distance between locations i and j (i, j ∈ [1, R]). NEG shows from a well-defined
model that both firms’ and workers’ location choices are related to such a measure of
access to markets.
4
Following Hanson (1998), we extend Krugman’s (1991) framework, introducing a
nontraded good which generates more realistic spatial dynamics. Moreover, we consider
migration costs and exogenous employment opportunities.
2.1 Production and consumption
The market consists of R regions endowed with two factors: immobile and mobile
labour. Each region produces three goods: A homogeneous “traditional” good (z),
non-traded services (y) and manufactured goods (x).
Commodity z is assumed to be homogeneous and produced under perfect competi-
tion. It is traded costlessly across regions and employs immobile labor only. Therefore,
the price of good z and the wages for immobile labour are the same everywhere. Taking
the price of z as the numeraire, we have pz = 1 in all regions.
Both manufactured goods and services are monopolistically competitive industries.
These industries employ mobile labour to produce horizontally differentiated varieties.
The production of each variety is subject to economies of scale. Within each industry,
the labour required to produce a quantity q is respectively : βxqx + εx and βyqy + εy,
where βx and εx (resp. βy and εy) are marginal and fixed input requirements for
production in industry x (resp. y). If nxit and nyit denote the number of varieties of
good x and y produced in region i at date t, the total employment in each industry or
region i at date t is:
Lxit = nxit (βxqxit + εx) and L
y
it = nyit (βyqyit + εy) i ∈ [1, R] (1)
Consumers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over goods:
Uit = C
µ
xitC
φ
yitC
1−µ−φ
zit , i ∈ [1, R] (2)
µ, φ and (1− µ− φ) are expenditure shares for manufactured goods, services and
the traditional good, respectively. Czit is the quantity of traditional good consumed in
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region i at date t. Cxit is a composite of manufacturing product varieties:
Cxit =
(
nxt∑
m=1
c (m)
σx−1
σx
xit
) σx
σx−1
, i ∈ [1, R] (3)
Where σx denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties, c (m)xit is the
quantity consumed of variety m in region i at date t, and nxt is the number of available
varieties in the economy (nxt =
∑R
i=1 nxit). Consumers cannot import service varieties
from other regions; therefore, the number of available y varieties in region i is the
number of varieties produced within the region (nyit), and Cyit is:
Cyit =
(
nyit∑
m′=1
c (m′)
σy−1
σy
yit
) σy
σy−1
, i ∈ [1, R] (4)
As usual in this framework, all producers have the same profit-maximizing price,
which is a constant markup over marginal cost. Denoting wit as the mobile workers’
wage in region i at date t, the fob price of a variety produced in region i is:
pxit =
σx
σx − 1βxwit and pyit =
σy
σy − 1βywit i ∈ [1, R] (5)
Moreover, free entry in each sector leads to zero-profits at equilibrium. Therefore,
using equations (1) and (5) and the equilibrium condition for each regional labour
market, one can derive the number of firms in each region:
nxit =
LXit
εxσx
and nyit =
LYit
εyσy
i ∈ [1, R] (6)
Finally, we allow for iceberg transport costs in shipping manufactured goods be-
tween regions. We assume a fraction (τij−1)/τij of the good melts away in transporta-
tion so that τij > 1 units of the good have to be exported from region i to deliver one
unit to region j. This transport cost is assumed to be an increasing function of the
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distance between the two regions dij:
τij = Bd
δ
ij ∀i, j ∈ [1, R] , δ > 0 and B > 0 (7)
2.2 Market potential function
Recalling that the price of the traditional good is normalized to one, the real wage of
mobile workers in region i is simply:
ωit =
wit
P φyitP
µ
xit
(8)
where Pxit (respectively Pyit) is the CES price index of the aggregate of industrial
(resp. service) goods in region i:
Pxit =
[
k=R∑
k=1
(
nxkt∑
m=1
(
Bdδikpxmkt
)1−σx)] 11−σx
=
[
k=R∑
k=1
nxkt
(
Bdδikpxkt
)1−σx] 11−σx
(9)
Pyit =
(
nit∑
m′=1
p
1−σy
ym′t
) 1
1−σy
= n
1
1−σy
yit pyit (10)
It is clear from (9) that the price index of manufactured goods can be thought of as
the inverse of a market potential function: it exhibits a comparable sum of market sizes
in all regions weighted by distances. Therefore, its interpretation is straightforward.
The price index is higher in remote regions where consumers have to import a large part
of their demand from distant locations. Similarly, leaving aside nominal wage, workers’
real income is lower in regions offering a relatively small number of service varieties.
This price index effect makes regions with a high density of services and low-cost
access to large manufacturing markets more attractive places to live. It is precisely the
Hirschman-type forward linkage that contributes to the cumulative process of spatial
agglomeration.
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2.3 Migration choice
Our model of migration follows that of Tabuchi & Thisse (2002). We consider a
mobile worker k from region j and his location choice among R regions (including
j). His migration choice results from a comparison of the perceived quality of life
in the various locations4. For empirical convenience, we assume that the migration
decision is designed to maximize the following objective function:
pikji,t = V
k
ji,t + ²
k
i = ln
[
ωi,tρi,t−1 [dij(1 + bFij)]
−λ
]
+ ²ki i ∈ [1, R] (11)
where ρi,t is the employment probability for an immigrant in region i at date t and
[dij(1 + bFij)]
λ is a migration cost which increases with the distance between home
and host regions. λ and b are strictly positive coefficients, and Fij is a dummy variable
indicating whether regions i and j do not share a common border. ²ki is a stochastic
component capturing k’s personal perception of the characteristics of region i. To
avoid an endogeneity problem when turning to empirical application, we assume that
migration choices at date t are determined from a comparison of V kji across regions
at date t − 1. Therefore, individual k will choose to locate in region i if V kji,t−1 >
V kjr,t−1, ∀ r 6= i. With these convenient assumptions on distribution of ²ki , the
probability of choosing region i is given by the logit function:
P (Mji,t) = e
V kji,t−1 /
R∑
r=1
eV
k
jr,t−1 (12)
The expected migration flow between regions j and i is Lj,tP (Mji,t). Noting that,
similarly, the total outflow from j is Lj,t [1− P (Mjj,t)], the share of emigrants from
region j choosing to go to region i is:
migrjit∑
i′ 6=j
migrji′t
=
eV
k
ji,t−1∑R
r=1 e
V kjr,t−1 − eV kjj,t−1
Using equations (5), (6), (8) (9), (10) and the definition of V kji,t, this share can be
4Following standard NEG models, we make the strong simplifying assumption that migration
decisions are based only on migration costs and current expected real wage differences. However,
Baldwin (2001) shows that allowing for forward-looking expectation does not significantly change the
theoretical conclusions when migrations costs are sufficiently high.
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written as:
ln
 migrjit∑
i′ 6=j
migrji′t
 = ln [(LYi(t−1)) φσy−1]+ ln
(k=R∑
k=1
LXk(t−1)
(
wk(t−1)dδij
)1−σx) µσx−1
+ ln
[
w1−φi(t−1)ρi(t−1)
]
+ ln [dij (1 + bFij)]
−λ + a˜j(t−1) (13)
With a˜j(t−1) = − ln
(∑R
r=1 e
V kjr,t−1 − eV kjj,t−1
)
.
Equation (13) captures the trade-off faced by potential migrants who have to choose
among several possible locations. The left-hand side of equation (13) is the share of
migrants from a given region who have decided to move to region i. On the right-
hand side, the third term represents the expected wage in the region, which increases
with the host region’s nominal wage and the probability of being employed in this
region. The fourth term captures the impact of bilateral distance on migration flows
and is interpreted as a measure of mobility cost. The first two first terms denote
region i’s access to markets: they are, respectively, the price indices for non-traded
service varieties and for manufactured goods in region i. The second term of equation
(13) is clearly the most important term in this equation. It corresponds to a market
potential function and relates labour migrations to the location of industrial activities
and can therefore be seen as the forward linkage emphasized by NEG. Moreover, the
main parameters of the NEG framework (elasticity of substitution and parameters of
the trade cost function) can be estimated from this price index function. Hence, if the
empirical analysis confirms that this price index actually governs migration flows, i.e.
that migrants do follow market potentials, it will validate the role of forward linkage
as a part of the endogenous agglomeration process.
3 Econometric specifications and data
We estimate two specifications of equation (13).
Clearly, equation (13) is closely related to a simple gravity equation. Besides nom-
inal wages and employment probability, the migration flow between two regions in-
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creases with the size of the host region and decreases with the geographic distance
between the two locations. Such a relation, while it is only a reduced form of equation
(13), may provide a good starting point for assessing whether migrants, as firms, are
attracted to large regional markets5. Such a gravity equation is a benchmark which
allows for the identification of possible specification issues and provides a grounded
competing model to the complete NEG framework.
There are several issues to address before performing estimations. An obvious proxy
for the probability of finding a job in the host region would be the regional employ-
ment rate Ei(t−1) (i.e. one minus unemployment rate), which is of course correlated
with nominal wages. Hence, to circumvent multicollinearity problems, we consider the
expected nominal wage as a single variable defined by the product of nominal wage and
employment rate: probwi(t−1) = wi(t−1)Ei(t−1). Furthermore, variables a˜j(t−1) do not de-
pend on destination region i. We thus allow for a more robust specification replacing
a˜jt with a time trend and fixed effects relative to home regions. Referring to equation
(13), we expect these fixed effects to be negative. Moreover, we introduce the loga-
rithm of the area of host region (log(Si)) in order to control for the bias resulting from
the inclusion of unequally-sized regions in the sample6. In order to control for peculiar
structural difficulties of possible host regions, we also introduce a dummy variable set
to 1 for host regions that are eligible for the European Commission regional funds given
under Objectives 1 or 2 (obji)
7. Finally, the gravity equation to be estimated is:
log
 migrjit∑
i′ 6=j
migrji′t
 = β1 log (Li(t−1))+ β2 log(probwi(t−1)) + β3 log(dij) (14)
+β4Fij + β5 log(Si) + aj + β6 log (trend) + obji + vijt,
where Li(t−1) is total employment in region i, aj is a full set of home region fixed
effects standing in for variables a˜j(t−1) in equation (13), and vijt is an error term.
5See for instance Helliwell (1997) for a similar study focusing on migrations in North America.
6This bias may be important: For instance, the largest German region in our sample (Bavaria -
70554 km2) is more than 170 times bigger than the smallest one (Bremen - 404 km2).
7Objective 1 promotes the development of regions with GDP per head below 75% of the Union
average, and Objective 2 is aimed at promoting the conversion of areas affected by industrial decline.
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Regional attractiveness should increase with the expected wage and decrease with
distance from the source region. Above all, one should expect coefficient β1 to be
significantly positive, since the NEG framework suggests that larger regions offer a
lower cost of living. Moreover, the model presented in the previous section suggests that
sectoral components of gross regional product have different influences on migration
choices. Thus, we also estimate a gravity equation in which regional employment is
split up into three industries (services Y , manufactured goods X and agriculture Z).
The second specification to be estimated is directly taken from the theoretical
model. Introducing probwi(t−1) and aj into equation (13), we obtain the following
non-linear testable equation:
log
 Migrji,t∑
k 6=j
Migrjk,t
 = µ
σx − 1 log
(
k=R∑
k=1
Lxk(t−1)
(
wk(t−1) (dik)
δ
)1−σx)
(15)
+α1 log
(
Lyi(t−1)
)
+ α2 log
(
probwi(t−1)
)− λ log (dij (1 + bFij))
+α3 log (Si) + aj + α4 log (trend) + obji + uijt
The differences between the gravity equation (14) and equation (15) are twofold.
First, the latter specification controls not only for the attraction of the local supply
of manufactured goods but also for access to all surrounding markets. Secondly, this
specification provides estimates of key parameters of the NEG framework (σx and δ).
Note that these parameters are related to the supply side of the model; thus, obtaining
consistent estimates for these parameters from migration flow data would indicate the
relevance of the cumulative process of agglomeration featured by NEG.
A major difficulty with equation (15) arises from the definition of the traditional
sector. According to the theoretical framework, the difference between sector x (‘man-
ufactured goods’) and z (‘traditional good’) lies in market structure and the presence
of scale economies: the ‘traditional’ sector should stand for all homogeneous produc-
tions with constant returns to scale, while all tradable and differentiated productions
with increasing returns to scale should be considered as ‘manufactured goods’. Unfor-
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tunately, we do not have detailed sectoral data at the regional level allowing such a
classification. The simplest solution, therefore, is to consider agriculture as a proxy for
‘traditional’ production, so that the x sector stands for all manufactured goods (model
1). To test the robustness of the results, we also perform regressions considering both
manufactured and agricultural goods as belonging to the x sector. In this specifica-
tion (refereed to as model 2), Lxi(t−1) becomes the sum of industrial and agriculture
employment, wxi(t−1) is the mean wage in agriculture and industry, and probwi(t−1) is
the product of employment rate and the mean regional wage. For both models 1 and
2, the parameters to estimate are the same. They are displayed in table 1.
——————————————————————————————
Insert Table 1 here
——————————————————————————————
We perform estimations of equations (14) and (15) for five European countries
(Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom). The data required,
excluding distances, are available from Regio database (Eurostat).
Migration data
Regio provides annual bilateral migration data at the regional level. While precious,
this information has three main shortcomings. First, data is limited to internal mi-
grations, and we have no information (at the regional level) about migrations among
European countries. Second, Regio does not provide data at a very detailed geographic
level: data is available at the NUTS 1 or NUTS 28, depending on the country (see data
appendix). Finally, the time span is not exactly the same for all of the countries:
1983-1992 for Germany, 1983-1993 for Spain and Italy, 1988-1994 for the Netherlands
and 1980-1985 Great Britain. For these reasons, we do not pool all the data together
but perform separate regressions for each country9.
8NUTS (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a nomenclature providing a hierarchical
structure of sub-national regions covering all European territory. Eurostat first subdivides countries of
the EU into 78 NUTS 1 (corresponding for instance to German Landers), each of them being divided
into several NUTS 2.
9Indeed, the higher costs of cross-border migrations lead to a decreased relevance of international
flows relative to internal ones (Helliwell, 1997).
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Market size and expected wages
Regio also provides data on sectoral employment, wages, unemployment rates and areas
at a regional level. Available British regional unemployment data only starts in 1983 so
that keeping employment rates in the estimations would drastically reduce the number
of observations. Hence, in the case of Britain, the variable probwi(t−1) is simply taken
to be the product of the nominal wage for each year (t− 1) and the employment rate
in 1983.
Distances
The model also requires a grounded measure of bilateral distances between all regions
of the same country (dij ∀i 6= j). This variable, which stands for both trade costs and
migration costs, is of particular importance. We greatly simplified measurement issues,
dropping data involving overseas territories, islands and Ulster, so that the distance
between two regions may be proxied by road distances between their respective capital
cities. Distances are estimations provided by an electronic road atlas 10 that calculates
the length of the quickest route between the two cities11. Thus, this measure takes into
consideration geographic elements such as mountains, lakes, density and quality of
road infrastructures. . . Besides inter-regional distances (dij, i 6= j), one needs a proxy
for internal distances dii. Indeed, the market potential term of equation (15) includes,
as for goods imported from abroad, the transport cost charged on x goods produced
and consumed locally. The internal distance is proxied by: dii = (2/3)
√
Si/pi, where
Si denotes the area of the region (Redding and Venables, 2002).
10ROUTE 66 Geographic Information Systems.
11These distances are available on line: http://team.univ-paris1.fr/trombi/crozet/data.htm
13
4 Results
4.1 The gravity equation
Equation (14) is estimated by ordinary least squares with a full set of fixed effects for
source regions. Tables 2 and 3 display regression results12.
——————————————————————————————
Insert Table 2 about here
Insert Table 3 about here
——————————————————————————————
The gravity-type model has a fairly high explanatory power. R2 are high, most
coefficients have the expected sign, and estimates from different countries have compa-
rable magnitudes. Distance always has the expected negative influence on migration.
The high value of this coefficient shows how reluctant European workers are to move
to a distant region. Moreover, migration costs seem to be even higher for long-distance
migrations: crossing more than one regional border reduces migration flows, at the
leastby 33% for Great-Britain (i.e 1 − 1/ exp(0.402)) and at the most by 55.5% for
Italy (i.e 1− 1/ exp(0.809)).
However, probwi(t−1) does not perform well. For Great Britain, the coefficient on
this variable is positive, as expected, but it is negative for the other countries. In the
case of Germany and the Netherlands, this result is probably the consequence of the
very low variability of wage and employment rates across regions. Indeed, a positive
collinearity for probwi(t−1), fixed effects aj and the trend variable shed doubt on the
robustness of this estimation. Multicollinearity among these regressors probably also
explains why coefficients on aj are positive, whereas the theoretical framework sug-
gests they should be negative. We confirm this intuition, regressing for these countries
a model excluding the variable probwi(t−1). It shows very positive properties: mul-
ticollinearity disappears and we obtain negative values for variables aj. Results on
other variables do not change significantly. For the other countries, counter-intuitive
12To save space, we report neither the coefficients on the dummies nor those on the fixed effects.
All results are, of course, available upon request.
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results on variable probwi(t−1) mainly reflect an issue commonly encountered in empir-
ical studies of internal migrations if one does not control for the migrant’s individual
characteristics and regional labour market structures13. For instance, in countries
where regional inequalities are substantial, such as Italy, one expects very important
centripetal migrations. However, differences in regional industrial structure reduce the
opportunities for workers from remote (low wage) regions to find jobs in a central (high
wage) location (Faini et al., 1997). Hence, in the case of Italy, we performed regressions
without considering migrations toward southern regions14. The focus on migrations to-
ward leading regions provides more convincing results (Cf. columns Italy-Total of table
3).
Finally, we observe a positive influence of total employment in the host region.
This significant effect confirms that migration patterns reveal centripetal dynamics.
However, considering separately the influence of employment in services, manufacturing
and agriculture, it appears that the positive influence of economic size is mainly due
to services. Local manufacturing employment has very little influence on regional
attractiveness, and its influence is even significantly negative for Germany and Spain.
Interpretation of this result is twofold. On the one hand, it may suggest that spatial
distribution of manufacturers does not influence migrants’ location choices. Hence,
workers would not move for better access to manufactures, as is suggested by the price
index effect at the heart of NEG models. On the other hand, it may suggest that
local employment in the tradable good is not an relevant proxy for regional access to
markets. Indeed, manufacturing firms supply all locations, so that local production is
only a slight part of access to markets defining the local price index and the incentives
to migrate. Thus, this result justifies the use of a real market potential function in
the spirit of NEG framework. These two interpretations lead to opposite conclusions
about the relevance of the NEG framework. The structural estimation of equation (13)
should settle this issue.
13See for instance, Greenwood 1975, Herzog et al. 1993 and Borjas 1999 for reviews and Decressin
and Fata`s, 1995, and Faini et al., 1997 for studies of the weak responsiveness of geographic mobility
to expected income differentials within European countries.
14We drop Lazio, Abruzzo-Molise, Campania and Puglia as possible destination regions.
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4.2 The NEG framework
We now turn to the estimation of equation (15) by non linear least squares. Obviously,
it is not possible to provide an estimation of both µ and σx since µ is not independently
attached to a variable. A simple way to overcome this problem is to treat µ as an
exogenous parameter. Recalling that µ is the expenditure share of x goods, we impose
µ = 0.4 in model 1 (where x stands for manufactured goods only) and µ = 0.6 in
model 2 (where x represents both agriculture and manufacturing)15. Tables (4) and
(5) display our estimation results. We do not report the coefficients on fixed effects aj,
but, in accordance with theoretical predictions, they proved to be significantly negative
in all regressions16.
——————————————————————————————
Insert Table (4) about here
Insert Table (5) about here
——————————————————————————————
Most parameters, in particular those which define the price index, converge toward
consistent values. The two specifications of (15) lead to comparable estimations. The
results show substantial differences among the various countries, but the coefficients
always have the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the results for equation (15)
are very similar to those estimated in the previous section. Following Hanson (1998),
we calculate the Schwarz information criterion to determine if this model is more
appropriate than the simple gravity equation17. In most cases (with the exception of
Italy), the Schwarz criterion indicates that the structural NEG model provides a better
fit.
15As a robustness test, we experimented with alternative values for µ. Higher values for µ lead to
higher estimates of σx and δ, but the other parameters remain almost unchanged.
16As in the previous section, fixed effects are positive for The Netherlands when probwi(t−1) remains
in the model.
17The Schwarz - or Bayesian - information criterion provides a simple method for model selection.
Defining M to be the maximum value of the likelihood, n the number of observations and k the
number of parameters, the criterion proposes to select the model for which −2 logM + k logn is
smallest.
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Migration costs and expected wage
The order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients on expected wage (α2) is very close
to the one obtained by the gravity-type equation. Results also show a great influence
of the variables capturing migration costs (λ and b) over migration flows. Compared
to the other Europeans, the British seem to be the most willing to move. A small
coefficient on distance (λ) is also observed for Italy. However, results for this country
also exhibit a troublingly high value for the b coefficient. Here again, estimations on
the restricted sample lead to more consistent results (see colons Italy-North in table
5).
Elasticities of substitution and transport cost: Migrants do follow market
potentials
In contrast to the simple gravity function, this second specification provides an esti-
mation of the parameters of the structural market potential function. We see from
tables (4) and (5) that this structural model generates very encouraging results: All
parameters defining the CES price indices (σx, δ and α1) have the expected sign and
are highly significant.
Results show, as expected, a strong positive influence of service employment in
the host region on migration flows. Coefficients α1 converge toward values between
0.43 and 0.97. To interpret this result, it is useful to recall that the theoretical model
allows for the derivation from coefficients α1 of the estimated values of the elasticity of
substitution between any pair of service varieties: σy =
φ
α1
−1. According to the values
chosen for µ, we set φ to 0.4, which is a reasonable value for the expenditure share of
non-traded services. Thus, computed values of σy lie between 1.41 for Italy to 1.93 for
the Netherlands. These estimations are consistent with the constraints imposed by the
theory. They are relatively low, which denotes a high degree of product differentiation.
Whereas gravity-type analysis showed that the size of local manufacturing employ-
ment in the destination region does not significantly affect migration decisions, we
observe here that parameters defining the market potential function are all significant.
17
In accordance with the NEG model’s prediction, access to manufactured commodities
do influence workers’ mobility since it is measured by a grounded market potential
function.
Indeed, elasticities of substitution between manufacturing varieties (σx) are always
strictly positive, and, as required by theory, significantly superior to one in every
country. They vary between 1.3 (UK) and 4.3 (The Netherlands). Aggregating both
manufacturing and agriculture in the x sector, elasticities take higher values (from
1.5 to 5.6) but remain very close to those derived from the first specification. These
values of elasticities of substitution are lower than those observed by Hanson (1998)
and in other related recent studies such as Baier & Bergstrand (2001) and Head & Ries
(2001)18.
One may be surprised by the substantial difference between our estimates of σx and
Hanson’s results. However, in our specification, the estimated value of σx is directly
dependent on the chosen value of µ. A higher value for µ should have led to higher
σx. Hanson’s estimations of µ are close to 0.9; hence, the ratios
µ
σ−1 he estimates range
between 0.13 and 0.25, which is comparable to the estimates reported in tables (4) and
(5).
Estimated values of δ are always strictly positive but vary considerably between
countries: They are greater than 3 for Germany and the Netherlands, but only around
0.5 for Spain. Consequently, the variation across countries of the complete coefficient
on transport cost (δ (1− σx)) is important (more than 10 for Germany and less than
0.5 for Spain and Great Britain). A high δ (1− σx) is a sign that the economic activity
in surrounding regions have little influence on regional price indexes. In other words,
this suggests that regional market potentials (as perceived by migrants) are essentially
influenced by the local level of production. The low δ (1− σx) observed for Spain and
United Kingdom can be explained by a greater sensibility of migrants to the differences
in market access, or the higher level of regional specialization in these countries, which
involves a greater influence of the market potential function in migration decisions.
18Hanson’s estimates of market potential lead to elasticities of substitution between 5 and 7.6. Head
& Ries (2001) and Baier & Bergstrand (2001) both study international trade flows ; their estimates
of σx lie between 6 and 11.
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5 Simulation exercices
This structural estimation provides empirical support for Krugman’s model (1991). It
also makes it possible to go further and evaluate the scope of agglomeration dynamics
at stake within each of the five European countries. Indeed, the strengths of centripetal
and centrifugal forces described by the theory are defined by the parameters estimated
in the previous section. To interpret the estimates in terms of spatial dynamics, this
section presents two complementary numerical evaluations.
The break point
In a simple Krugman (1991) model, the analysis of the equilibrium often goes through
a calculation of the conditions under which a core-periphery pattern is the only stable
solution (Fujita et al., 1999). These conditions define a threshold level of inter-regional
transport cost at which the economy converges towards a core-periphery pattern. This
transport cost, known as the break point of the model, can be interpreted unambigu-
ously as a measure of the relative scope of centripetal forces. The expression for the
break point value only depends on the key parameters that define the price index (i.e.
the share of expenditure on differentiated goods and the elasticity of substitution):
τBreak =
[
[σx(1 + µ)− 1] (1 + µ)
[σx(1− µ)− 1] (1− µ)
]1/(σx−1)
This break point is derived from a two-region model that assumes zerono intra-
regional trade costs. The introduction of internal trade costs does not significantly
change the model, but the break point turns out to be a threshold relative trade cost:
(τij/τii)
Break. Using (7), we can express the break point as a relative distance:
(
dij
dii
)Break
=
[
[σx(1 + µ)− 1] (1 + µ)
[σx(1− µ)− 1] (1− µ)
]1/[δ(σx−1)]
(16)
——————————————————————————————
Insert Table (6) about here
——————————————————————————————
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Table (6) reports these minimal distances calculated with the parameters estimated
in the previous section19.
These relative distances indicate how far the agglomeration forces emanating from
a region extend across space: multiplying the relative distance by the internal distance
of a central region, one obtains the radius where any activity with increasing return
to scale should be attracted to the core. In Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the
threshold relative distances are relatively short (between 1.2 and 2.5), which suggests
that the scope of centripetal forces is small. Therefore, in those countries a significant
center-periphery pattern can only emerge between very close regions. For instance, the
Italian region of Lombardia has an internal distance of 58 kilometers, so centripetal
forces emanating from these regions should dominate within a radius around its center
ranging between 94.5 km (1.63 x 58) and 150.2 km (2.49 x 58). These distances are too
small to threaten neighboring regions20. For Germany, the magnitude of centripetal
forces seems even smaller: the Bavarian region has an internal distance of about 100 km
and possibly attracts activities located within a radius of only 120 to 135 km from its
center. In the cases of Spain and Great Britain, the break points cannot be calculated:
the no black hole condition that permits the existence of a dispersed equilibrium does
not hold21. Therefore, in these two countries, workers’ movements reveal extremely
strong self-sustaining processes of agglomeration.
Predicted migration flows
The break point is a simple and practical tool. It is, however, limited since it does not
include migration costs. Therefore, we have to compute more accurate spatial relations
to appraise the real scope of agglomeration dynamics within European countries. To
this end, we figure the predicted gross share of emigrants for different relative regional
sizes. Such a simulation shows, using all estimated parameters, the strength of the
response of the European workforce facing a given regional inequality.
To simplify the simulation exercise, we consider a two-region economy (i and j) with
19For Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the parameters from the restricted regressions are used.
20Milano, the main Lombardian city, is within 141 km of Turin, 164 km of Genova, and 576 km of
Roma.
21The no black hole condition is σx−1σx > µ (Fujita et al., 1999).
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identical internal distances, wages, employment opportunities and shares of services in
total employment. The two regions differ only in population size: Region j is assumed
to be a peripheral region, so that Lj < Li. Very simple manipulations of equations (12)
and (11) yield the following equation for the share of emigrants in the total population
of region j:
Migrij
Lj
=
∆
∆+ [dij(1 + b)]
λ
; ∆ =
Lα1i
(
Li(d
δ(1−σ)
ii ) + Lj(d
δ(1−σ)
ij )
)µ/(σ−1)
Lα1j
(
Lj(d
δ(1−σ)
jj ) + Li(d
δ(1−σ)
ij )
)µ/(σ−1)
Figure (1) plots these emigration shares, using the parameters of model 1 displayed
in tables (4) and (5)22. Internal distances djj and dii are set to 75 km, which is roughly
consistent with the real size of large European regions.
——————————————————————————————
Insert Figure1 here
——————————————————————————————
As expected, the number of workers who choose to move to the core region is greater
when regional inequality is sizeable. The simulations underscore the weakness of the
response of labour markets to regional inequalities. Excepting Great Britain, the gross
emigration shares are very low, even when regional inequality is rather large23. Even
more interesting is the finding that centripetal migration decreases with inter-regional
distance in all of the five countries. Indeed, in theory the influence of inter-regional
distance on migration flows results from a trade-off. On the one hand, the model
suggests that a greater inter-regional distance strengthens the forward linkage that
contributes to the agglomeration dynamics: a higher transportation cost increases the
cost of living far away from the larger market and thus heightens migration incentives.
On the other hand, inter-regional distance positively influences migration costs. Hence,
22As previously, we use the estimates from the restricted regressions for Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands.
23Note that these values are all slightly larger than but roughly consistent with the real mean gross
migration shares.
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the overall negative influence of distance on migrations provides evidence that workers’
sensitivity to migration costs tends to overcome agglomeration forces. In other words,
labour mobility in Europe is sufficiently low to make the swift emergence of a core-
periphery pattern very unlikely at a large geographical level. This result applies for all
of the five countries, even those for which the magnitude of centripetal forces is rather
large, as suggested by the break point analysis. For instance, in the Netherlands,
table (6) suggests that a core-periphery pattern may be sustainable for a relative inter-
regional distance of 2. However, figure (1) shows that, for such a distance, less than
1% of the population in the periphery will move to the core region. The British case
is also interesting. Just as for the other countries, the relation between distance and
migrations is negative. However, the slope is smaller and the estimated shares of
emigrants are distinctly larger. Hence, the geographic scope of forward linkage is much
larger in this country.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims to contribute to the empirical assessment of new economic geography
models. Recent developments in spatial agglomeration theories, based on Krugman’s
(1991) article, are abundant and have received particular attention from policymakers,
especially in Europe. The basic intuition of the model highlights the influence of
access to markets - represented by a market potential function - on location choices
of both firms and workers. The cumulative process of agglomeration rests on the
complementarity of these two relations: agglomeration may occur only if migrants,
like firms, are attracted by high market potential regions.
Although most empirical papers on the field focus on the backward effect (which
relates the location choices of firms to the geography of demand), we use interregional
migration data for five European countries to establish the validity of forward linkage
(which relates the location choices of individuals to the geography of supply).
First, a gravity equation provides a benchmark analysis of the determinants of
labour migration within European countries. The results indicate that wealthy regions
attract more migrants. However, this is mainly due to the influence of the local supply
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of services, whereas local manufacturing employment seems to have no influence on
migration flows. This result may be interpreted either as a failure of the price index
effect hypothesis, or as a justification for the use of a more grounded model. Thus,
the paper presents structural estimates of the migration equation derived from a NEG
model. Such estimation yields to the core results of this study.
Forward linkage emphasized by New Economic Geography models is relevant. Ac-
cess to markets positively influences migration choices through the industrial price
index effect. The relatively good fit displayed by the New Economic Geography model
(compared to a simple gravity model) and the concordance in sign and magnitude be-
tween the estimated parameters and the theoretical predictions proves the empirical
validity of this theoretical framework. Finally, the parameter estimates allow for eval-
uation of the extent of agglomeration dynamics at work within European countries.
Simulations of the theoretical model suggest that centripetal forces - except in Spain
and Great Britain - are very limited in geographic scope. Moreover, we show that, in
all of the five countries, barriers to migration are high enough to balance the centripetal
forces. Thereby, partly because of the low propensity to migrate, it seems very unlikely
that a catastrophic core-periphery pattern will emerge within European countries, or
a fortiori on a greater scale.
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A Data appendix
• Germany. Period: 1983-1992. 10 regions (NUTS 1): Baden-Wurttenberg,
Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-
Pfalz, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein.
• Italy. Period: 1983-1993. 18 regions (NUTS 2): Piemonte, Valle d’Aoste, Lig-
uria, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna,
Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Cal-
abria.
• Spain. Period: 1983-1993. 15 regions (NUTS 2): Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria,
Pais Vasco, Navarra, Rioja, Aragon, Madrid, Castilla-Leon, Castilla-La Mancha, Ex-
tremaduras, Catalunia, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucia, Murcia.
• Netherland. Period: 1988-1994. 10 regions (NUTS 2): Groningen, Friesland,
Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland, Utrech, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zee-
land.
• Great Britain. Period: 1980-1985. 10 regions (NUTS 1): North, Yorkshire
and Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, South East, South West, West Midlands,
North West, Wales, Scotland.
B Tables and figues
Table 1: Coefficients and expected values
Coefficients Expected values
σx Elasticity of substitution - sector x 1 < σx
µ Share of consumer expenditure on good x µ = 0.4 or 0.6
δ Elasticity of trade costs to distance 0 < δ
α1 = φσy−1 Influence of local services supply 0 < α1 < 1
α3 Influence of expected wage 0 < α3
λ Distance elasticity of migration cost 0 < λ
b Influence of borders on migration cost 0 < b
α4 Influence of the size of host region 0 < α4
aj Home regions fixed effects 0 > aj
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Table 2: Gravity-type equation (eq. 14) - OLS / fixed effects
Dependant variable: log(migrjit/
∑
i′ 6=jmigrji′t)
Germany Germany Spain Great Britain
Total employment 0.934a – 0.735a – 0.944a – 0.794a –
log
 
Li(t−1)

(0.039) (0.032) (0.013) (0.020)
Service employment – 0.818a – 0.788a – 1.039a – 0.718a
log Ly
i(t−1) (0.104) (0.104) (0.041) (0.076)
Indus. employment – -0.137 – -0.210b – -0.168a – 0.055
log Lx
i(t−1) (0.093) (0.090) (0.042) (0.086)
Agri. employment – 0.264a – 0.302 – 0.043a – -0.031
log Lz
i(t−1) (0.045) (0.043) (0.020) (0.064)
Prob-wage -2.708a§ -1.126a§ – – -0.357a -0.239a 0.796a 0.754a
log
 
wi(t−1)Ei(t−1) (0.325) (0.387) (0.039) (0.042) (0.052) (0.109)
Distance -0.919a -0.907a -0.908a -0.906a -0.807a -0.793a -0.454a -0.489a
log(dij) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
No-border -0.667a -0.602a -0.643a -0.586a -0,648a -0.671a -0.417a -0.402a
Fij (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.044) (0.047) (0.035) (0.035)
Surface -0.017 -0.014 0.115a 0.003 0.043a -0.005 0.025 0.020
log(Si) (0.024) (0.037) (0.018) (0.033) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.033)
aj (sign) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Nb. Obs. 900 900 900 900 2310 2310 540 540
R2 0.9788 0.9799 0.9772 0.9792 0.9789 0.9798 0.9905 0.9907
F-Stat 2402 2143 2365 2241 4619 4437 3205 2914
Schwarz Criterion 1238.7 1101.6 1300.2 1103.4 3564.1 3404.2 166.7 168.7
Standards errors in parenthesis; a, b = significance at 1 and 5% levels.
§: significant multicollinearity affects the fixed effect and the coefficients relating to Prob-wage.
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Table 3: Gravity-type equation (eq. 14) - OLS / fixed effects
Dependant variable: log(migrjit/
∑
i′ 6=jmigrji′t)
The Netherlands The Netherlands Italy- Total Italy- North
Total employment 0.652a – 0.584a – 0.936a 0.945a –
log
 
Li(t−1)

(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) – (0.021)
Service employ. 0.101 -0.013 – 0.537a – 0.326a
log Ly
i(t−1) – (0.078) (0.085) (0.038) (0.053)
Indus. employ. 0.506a – 0.558a – 0.254a – 0.681a
log Lx
i(t−1) – (0.072) (0.078) (0.035) (0.047)
Agri. employ. 0.144a – 0.152a – 0.162a – -0.168a
log Lz
i(t−1) – (0.041) (0.045) (0.017) (0.047)
Prob-wage -0.462a§ -4.489a§ – – -0.407a 0.183 0.801a 0.705a
log
 
wi(t−1)Ei(t−1) (0.414) (0.411) (0.089) (0.121) (0.136) (0.136)
Distance -1.050a -1,109a -1.146a -1.216a -0.231a -0.241a -0.836a -0.883a
log(dij) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.024) (0.025) (0.036) (0.040)
No-border -0.386a -0.353a -0.353a -0.313a -0.809a -0.789a -0.522a -0.508a
Fij (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038)
Surface 0.051 -0.149a 0.137a -0.095 -0.024 -0.062 -0.156a -0.081b
log(Si) (0.035) (0.057) (0.037) (0.062) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035) (0.040)
aj (sign) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Nb. Obs. 630 630 630 630 3366 3366 2033 2033
R2 0.9909 0.9912 0.9891 0.8912 0.9782 0.9782 0.9841 0.9847
F-Stat 3948 3631 3486 3631 6244 5727 5231 5036
Schwarz Criterion 290.7 284.4 400.8 390.4 5856.9 5891.2 3014.8 2946.0
Standards errors in parenthesis; a, b= significance at 1 and 5% levels
§: significant multicollinearity affects the fixed effect and the coefficients relating to Prob-wage.
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Table 4: Non-linear Least Squares / Fixed Effects
Dependant variable: log(migrjit/
∑
i′ 6=jmigrji′t)
Germany Germany Spain Great Britain
model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
σx 3.740# 5.130# 3.850# 5.250# 1.534# 1.601# 1.304# 1.534#
(elast. of substitution) (0.663) (0.999) (0.674) (1.001) (0.159) (0.216) (0.108) (0.229)
δ 3.619a 2.490a 3.760a 2.560a 0.461a 0.621a 1.536a 1.018a
(transport cost) (0.524) (0.351) (0.521) (0.348) (0.161) (0.164) (0.210) (0.138)
α1 0.723a 0.716a 0.722a 0.715a 0.904a 0.909* 0.725a 0.724a
(service employment) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022)
α2 -0.079 -0.057 - - -0.394a -0.323a 0.205a 0.208a
(prob. wage) (0.073) (0.073) (0.046) (0.044) (0.023) (0.023)
λ 0.922a 0.922a 0.923a 0.923a 0.764a 0.752a 0.475a 0.475a
(migration cost) (0.040) (0.040) (0.04) (0.04) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
b 0.862a 0.856a 0.851a 0.848a 1.412a 1.453a 1.265a 1.267a
(no-border) (0.145) (0.145) (0.143) (0.144) (0.220) (0.229) (0.289) (0.288)
α4 0.684a 0.700a 0.703a 0.715a 0.036a 0.037a 0.235a 0.235a
(surface) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.014) (0.015) (0.041) (0.041)
Nb. Obs 900 900 900 900 2310 2310 540 540
R2 0.8798 0.8786 0.8796 0.8785 0.8271 0.8269 0.8806 0.8817
MSE 0.1991 0.2011 0.1992 0.2010 0.2472 0.2475 0.0720 0.0713
Schwarz Criterion 1211.6 1220.5 1206.2 1214.4 3495.6 3499.6 212.1 206.8
White consistent standard errors in parenthesis; a = significance at 1% levels; #= greater than 1 at 1% level.
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Table 5: Non-linear Least Squares / Fixed Effects
Dependant variable: log(migrjit/
∑
i′ 6=jmigrji′t)
The Netherlands The Netherlands Italy - Total Italy - North
model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
σx 4.316# 5.630# 3.647# 4.626# 3.579# 4.165# 2.751# 3.283#
(elast. of substitution) (1.101) (1.715) (0.709) (1.060) (0.381) (0.430) (0.326) (0.392)
δ 1.416a 1.074a 1.783a 1.366a 3.545a 2.357a 2.711a 1.915a
(transport cost) (0.298) (0.241) (0.299) (0.241) (0.160) (0.106) (0.226) (0.153)
α1 0.463a 0.469a 0.429a 0.435a 0.974a 0.963a 0.936a 0.945a
(service employ.) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
α2 -0.454a -0.453a – – -0.059b 0.043 0.044 0.073b
(prob. wage) (0.077) (0.077) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036)
λ 1.019a 1.023a 1.022a 1.027a 0.313a 0.291a 0.819a 0.812a
(migration cost) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
b 0.514a 0.508a 0.516a 0.509a 9.044a 11.836a 0.884a 0.901a
(no-border) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (2.632) (3.77) (0.129) (0.132)
α4 0.469a 0.452a 0.601a 0.584a 0.032 0.047 0.001 -0.019
(surface) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034)
Nb. Obs 630 630 630 630 3366 3366 2057 2057
R2 0.9135 0.9136 0.9086 0.9088 0.7851 0.7932 0.8599 0.8591
MSE 0.0875 0.0873 0.0922 0.0921 0.3489 0.3357 0.2366 0.2379
Schwarz Criterion 356.1 355.2 384.1 383.2 6073.1 5943.1 3044.4 3056.4
White consistent standard errors in parenthesis; a, b= significance at 1 and 5% levels; #= greater than 1 at 1% level.
Table 6: Breaking points (Threshold relative distances)
Germany Spain Italy The Netherlands Great Britain
Model 1 1.21 BH 1.63 1.56 BH
Model 2 1.35 BH 2.49 2.00 BH
BH = black hole condition
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Figure 1: Rates of emigration: Migrji/Lj. (wi = wj ; dii = dij = 100)
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